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AGENDA V.B.:L 
The Faretta Principle: Self-Representation versus 
the Right to Counsel 
Paul Marcus• 
The United States Constitution makes provision for criminal de-
fendants to be represented by counsel. In the federal jurisdiction 
this principle was vigorously applied, even to indigent persons, very 
early in the Twentieth Century. The United States Supreme Court, 
however, was reluctant to impose this requirement on the states ex-
cept in cases of unusual circumstances where the absence of coun-
sel would have affected the basic fairness of the trial. Finally, in a 
landmark decision by the Supreme Court, it was held that the right 
to counsel applies in both federal and state cases. For the past 
twenty years, federal and state judges have been concerned with the 
application of this right to counsel: the kinds of persons who are to 
benefit from it, the types of cases in which counsel is required, and 
the nature of proceedings other than trial to which the right applies. 
In recent years, however, an emerging right has developed, the 
right of the defendant to represent himself at trial. This right was 
mandated by the Supreme Court in 1975 and has led to considerable 
confusion in both the state and federal courts. The relationship be-
tween this right and the right to counsel has posed a dilemma for 
judges and has created practical difficulties at trial. 
In this article the basic right to counsel will be explored leading 
to a discussion of the right of self-representation. Ultimately, the 
tension between these two rights will be evaluated. 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
1. The Principle is Established 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides in material 
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right .... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his Defence." The 
problems in applying this right have rarely arisen in connection 
with retained counsel for affluent defendants; instead, the difficulty 
has been in deciding when counsel had to be provided by the gov-
ernment for persons who could not afford their own lawyers.1 As 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. The valuable research assistance of 
Lee Smalley, University of Illinois, College of Law, 1981, is gratefully acknowledged. 
1. The Supreme Court in 1932 held that a hearing "has always included the right 
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Chief Justice WaiTen noted: 
Regardless of whether petitioners would have been en-
titled to the appointment of counsel, his right to be heard 
through his own counsel was unqualified.2 
In 1938 the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment 
meant that counsel had to be appointed for indigents in all federal 
cases. Justice Black established the indigent's right to appointed 
counsel quite clearly: 
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to 
counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting 
from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional 
rights .... 
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles 
one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel, compli-
ance with this constitutional mandate is an essential juris-
dictional prerequisite to a federal court authority to deprive 
an accused of his life or liberty . . . . If the accused, how-
ever, is not represented by counsel and has not competently 
and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth 
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid convic-
tion and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.3 
While the federal right was thus well established, considerable 
question existed as to whether there was a parallel requirement for 
the states, considering that the Sixth Amendment as such was not 
applied to the states.4 In Powell v. Alabama 5 the defendants were 
black youths who were poorly educated and were strangers in the 
community where they were aiTested. They were hurried to trial for 
a capital ofense without adequate opportunity to consult with coun-
sel. In Alabama at that time the state law required the appointment 
of counsel for indigent defendants prosecuted for capital offenses. 
The Court held that under those circumstances "the necessity of 
counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court 
to make an effective appointment of counsel was . . . a denial of due 
process. "6 
The difficult question of the general application of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to the states was left open in Powell, 
however. 
Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or 
under other circumstances we need not determine. All that 
is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a cap-
ital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, 
to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right." 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932). 
2. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9, 99 L. Ed. 4, 75 S. Ct. 1 (1954). 
3. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 467-68, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). 
4. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1883). 
5. 287 U.S. 45, 77 L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55 (1932). 
6. 287 U.S. at 71. 
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and is incapable adequately of making his own defence be-
cause of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, 
it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to as-
sign eounsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process 
of law .... 7 
553 
In 1942, the Supreme Court resolved this right to counsel issue. 
In Betts tJ. Brady8 the petitioner was convicted of robbery in the 
state courts of Maryland. Because of his poverty he was unable to 
employ counsel and requested that the judge appoint a lawyer to 
represent him. The judge refused the request because at that time 
only defendants charged with murder or rape were entitled to ap-
pointed counsel. The Court began its discussion with the notation 
that the defendant's position was that in all criminal cases, whether 
state or federal, indigent defendants charged with crimes must be 
furnished counsel by the state. The Court went on to discuss the 
application of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
'I'he Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution ap-
plies only to trials in federal courts. The due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as 
such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment 
although a denial by a state of rights or privileges specifi-
cally embodied in that and others of the first eight amend-
ments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with 
other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant 
of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth. Due 
process of law is secured against invasion by the federal 
Government by the Fifth Amendment and is safeguarded 
against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth. 
The phrase formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid 
than those envisaged in other specific and particular provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of 
rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the 
totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one set-
ting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to 
the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, 
and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such 
denial.9 
The Court held that the due process clause did not demand that 
in every case, whatever the circumstances, the state must furnish a 
lawyer to an indigent defendant. It was in the trial court's discretion 
"if it deems proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to 
be required in the interest of fairness."10 Absent unusual circum-
stances rising to a level of a due process violation, criminal indigent 
7. Id. 
8. 316 U.S. 455, 86 L. Ed. 1595, 62 S. Ct. 1252 (1942). 
9. 316 U.S. at 461-62. 
10. Id. at 471-72. 
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defendants generally do not have the right to appointed counsel in 
state cases. 
Justice Black vigorously dissented. 11 He argued that the right to 
counsel in criminal trials was "fundamental" and that the denial of 
that right raised due process concerns.12 
A practice cannot be reconciled with "common and funda-
mental ideas of fairness and rights", which subjects inno-
cent men to increased dangers of conviction merely because 
of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be de-
termined from a trial in which, as here, the denial of counsel 
has made it impossible to conclude with any satisfactory de-
gree of certainty, that the defendant's case was adequately 
presented.13 
In spite of this powerful dissent, it was thus clear after Betts 
that the Sixth Amendment as such did not mandate the appoint-
ment of counsel in all cases in which indigents were on trial for 
criminal offenses. Betts, when taken with Powell, did indicate that 
in at least some criminal cases counsel would be required for fair-
ness purposes under the due process clause. For instance, in Bute v. 
Illinois 14 the Court adopted the view that counsel would be re-
quired in all state capital cases. Moreover, with further analysis of 
the so-called special circumstances requirement for counsel under 
the due process clause it became apparent that very little was 
needed to demonstrate special circumstances. See, e.g., Chewning v. 
Cunningham, 15 where the petitioner raised claims under the Vir-
ginia recidivist statute; he did not, however, show that the denial of 
his request for appointed counsel necessarily resulted in unfairness 
at trial. He simply raised possible arguments which a lawyer might 
have asserted in his defense. The Court held that the possibility of 
developing such arguments was sufficient to warrant the appoint-
ment of counsel under the due process clause. 
Double Jeopardy and ex postjacto application in a law 
are also questions which ... may well be considered by an 
imaginative lawyer, who looks critically at the layer of prior 
convictions on which the recidivist charge rests. We inti-
mate no opinion on whether any of the problems mentioned 
would arise on petitioner's trial nor, if so, whether any 
would have merit. We only conclude that a trial on a charge 
of being a habitual criminal is such a serious one, the issues 
presented under Virginia's statute so complex, and the po-
tential prejudice resulting from the absence of counsel so 
great that the rule we have followed concerning the appoint-
ment of counsel in other types of criminal trials is equally 
11. Along with Justices Douglas and Murphy. 
12. 316 U.S. at 475. 
13. Id. at 476. 
14. 333 U.S. 640, 92 L. Ed. 986, 68 S. Ct. 763 (1948). 
15. 368 U.S. 443, 7 L. Ed. 2d 442, 82 S. Ct. 498 (1962). 
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applicable here.I6 
Gideon v. Wainwright,I? decided just 20 years after the Betts 
case, was a landmark opinion for the American criminal justice sys-
tem. The case, argued for the defendant in the Supreme Court by 
former Justice Abe Fortas, arose after the defendant was charged 
with a felony in a Florida state court. The following colloquy took 
place in the trial court: 
The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint 
Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the 
State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Coun-
sel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged 
with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny 
your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case. 
The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says 
I am entitled to be represented by Counse1.1s 
In the 20 years since Betts had been decided the composition of the 
Supreme Court had changed markedly.19 The clear majority of the 
Court in 1963 accepted the basic premises argued by Justice Black 
in Betts2·0 and designated Justice Black to write the majority opinion 
in Gideon. Finding that Betts was "an anchronism when handed 
down",21 the Court discussed the great importance of the right to 
counsel and the need to designate it a fundamental right applicable 
to the states under the due process clause. 
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court:, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to 
us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and fed-
eral, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish 
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to 
prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the 
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are 
few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to 
hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present 
their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute 
and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend 
are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that 
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The 
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be 
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
16. 368 U.S. at 447. 
17. 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963). 
18. 372 U.S. at 337. 
19. When Betts was decided the Court consisted of Chief Justice Stone, and Jus-
tices Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes, and Jackson. 
When Gideon was decided, the Court consisted of Chief Justice Warren, and Justices 
Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg. 
20. Indeed, only Justices Douglas, Clark, and Harlan wrote concurring opinions. 
21. 372 U.S. at 345. 
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countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our 
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great 
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in 
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This 
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with 
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist 
him.22 
While Gideon was a seminal case,23 many questions were not an-
swered by it. Gideon had been tried for a serious felony offense, 
had been sentenced to serve five years, and had only requested 
counsel for the trial itself. The Supreme Court did not indicate what 
would happen in a less serious case, one in which no sentence of im-
prisonment was ordered, or one in which the defendant requested 
counsel to represent him in non-trial proceedings. 
2. The Indigent Defendant 
In Gideon itself the state did not argue that the defendant could 
afford to employ counsel. To be sure, in many cases the indigency 
of the defendant is not truly at issue. In some cases, however, the 
only isue is whether or not the state should have to provide a lawyer 
for a defendant who is arguably able to pay for it himself. See, for 
instance, State v. Ho.ffman 24 where the court found that the defend-
ant was able to afford an attorney because he had $160 in the bank. 
We take judicial notice that for a fee of less than $160 
the defendant could have obtained counsel.25 
Other courts have been considerably less inclined to rely on the de-
fendant's relatively sparse assets in determining need. As stated by 
the California Supreme Court: 
It is not necessary . . . to establish total destitution al-
though he may be required to establish more than that the 
payment of the required fee would be burdensome or 
inconvenient.26 
Part of the difficulty for the indigency determination was satis-
fied in a number of states by the adoption of recoupment state-
ments. In these states, laws were passed which required, as a 
condition of probation, that the convicted defendant pay back to the 
state the fees of his appointed attorney. These statutes were upheld 
by the Supreme Court in Fuller v. Oregon 27 because, among other 
provisions, there existed a statutory exemption for defendants who 
could show that repayment would impose "manifest hardship." 
22. /d. at 344. 
23. The case has been held to be fully retroactive in application; a violation of it is 
prejudicial error per se. 
24. 281 N.C. 727, 190 S.E.2d 842 (1972). 
25. 190 S.E.2d at 850. 
26. March v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal.3d 422, 102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 498 P.2d 437 (1972). 
27. 417 U.S. 40, 40 L. Ed. 2d 642, 94 S. Ct. 2116 (1974). 
REPRESENTATION: SELF OR COUNSEL 
3. What Kinds of Criminal Trials? 
a. The Nature of the Trials 
557 
Because the defendant had been charged with a serious of-
fense2B and had been given a substantial sentence,29 the Court in 
Gideon did not have to confront the situation in which the defend-
ant requested counsel when he had neither been charged with a se-
rious offense nor received a sentence of imprisonment. In 
Argersinger v. Hamlin,30 the defendant was charged in state court 
with carrying a concealed weapon. This offense was punishable by 
imprisonment up to six months, a $1,000 fine, or both. The defend-
ant at trial was not represented by counsel and was sentenced to 
serve 90 days in jail. The Florida supreme court held that the right 
to government provided counsel extended only to trials "for non-
petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment."31 The United States Supreme Court rejected the Florida rule 
and held that no imprisonment may be imposed unless the accused 
is represented by counsel. 
Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their ra-
tionale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an ac-
cused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon suggest 
that there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all 
such criminal prosecutions . . . . 
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a 
fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We are by no 
means convinced that legal and constitutional questions in-
volved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even 
for a brief period are any less complex than when a person 
can be sent off for six months or more. 
The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only 
brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the cases 
often bristle with thorny constitutional questions . . . . 
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the 
guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as 
well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so that the ac-
cused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is 
fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so 
that he is treated fairly by the prosecution . . . . 
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associ-
ated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the 
28. The defendant was convicted of the felony of breaking and entering a pool· 
room with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. 
29. Gideon was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years in the state 
prison. 
30. 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972). 
31. The Florida court linked the right to counsel with the right to trial by jury. In 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), the Court held 
that jury trials were required only for non-petty offenses punishable by more than 6 
months imprisonment. 
558 PAUL MARCUS 
presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial. 32 
Justice Powell, concurring in the result, raised the question of 
whether the problem in misdemeanor cases which required the 
presence of counsel might not also be raised even in situations 
where there was no prospect of imprisonment. Because the defend-
ant had in fact received imprisonment, the Court did not have to 
face this question. 
In Scott v. Illinois 33 the question reserved by the Court in 
Argersinger was faced squarely. Scott had been convicted of theft 
and fined $50. The state statute set the maximum penalty for the 
ofense at a $500 fine or one year in jail. Thus, the defendant could 
have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment but was not. For 
the disenting Justices34 the possibility of imprisonment-the "au-
thorized imprisonment" standard-necessitated the appointment of 
counsel. 
The majority in Scott, in an opinion written by Justice Rehn-
quist, rejected the authorized imprisonment standard. Instead, the 
Court concluded "that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it 
should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indi-
gent defendant had been offered appointed counsel to assist in his 
defense."35 As the opinion stated, "actual imprisonment is a penalty 
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment."36 
The lesson after Argersinger and Scott is that Gideon will apply 
to many-perhaps most--criminal cases because prior to the start of 
trial the judge may not know whether he is likely to impose a sen-
tence of imprisonment. Hence, if there is the possibility of impris-
onment the judge would be well advised to appoint counsel. This 
point was made forcefully in Baldasar v. Illinois .37 Under Illinois 
law certain thefts were deemed misdemeanors, except that for sec-
ond convictions the defendant would be treated as a felon and could 
be sentenced to a relatively lengthy prison term. The defendant in 
the first theft case was not represented by counsel and he received a 
fine of only $159, perfectly proper under Scott. In the second trial, 
for an unrelated theft offense, he was represented by counsel. At 
this trial he was convicted and sentenced under the Illinois en-
hancement statute to a 1-3 year term in prison. The Supreme Court 
held that the sentence violated Scott, Argersinger, and Gideon in 
that it imposed punishment based upon a trial at which the defend-
ant was not represented by counsel. As stated by Justice Stewart in 
concurrence: 
In Scott v. Illinois, the Court held that ·"the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
32. 407 U.S. at 32-36. 
33. 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979). 
34. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 
35. 440 U.S. at 372-73. 
36. Id. at 373. 
37. 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585 (1980). 
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require that no indigent criminal defendant be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has af-
forded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in 
his defense." 
In this case the indigent petitioner, after his conviction 
of petit larceny, was sentenced to an increased term of im-
prisonment only because he had been convicted in a previ-
ous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of 
appointed counsel in his defense. 
It seems clear to me that this prison sentence violated 
the constitutional rule of Scott v. lllinois.38 
b. Counsel in Non-trial Proceedings 
559 
Soon after the decision of the Supreme Court in Gideon, de-
fendants claimed Sixth Amendment rights beyond the scope of that 
monumental case. In particular, defendants argued, that providing 
counsel at trial was only a partial fulfillment of the Sixth Amend-
ment responsibility of the government. The Supreme Court was 
persuaded that failing to provide counsel at pre-trial confrontations 
would violate the Sixth Amendment as well. In Hamilton v. Ala-
bama39 the defendant was found to have a right to counsel at a pre-
trial arraignment where certain rights could be sacrificed or lost.40 
Similarly, in Coleman v. Alabama,41 the Court held that the defend-
ant was entitled to the appointment of counsel at a preliminary 
hearing42 even though the hearing was not a mandatory step in the 
state prosecution, the accused was not required to advance any de-
fenses, and the failure to advance defenses did not preclude him 
from raising them at trial. The Supreme Court in both Coleman and 
Hamilton recognized that counsel was necessary to protect the ulti-
mate fairness at trial. As stated in Coleman: 
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary 
hearing is essential to protect the indigent accused against 
an erToneous or improper prosecution. First the lawyer's 
skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses 
may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case that may 
lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Sec-
ond, :in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by 
an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool 
for use in cross-examination of the State's witnesses at the 
trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a 
38. 100 S. Ct. at 1586-87. 
39. 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1961). 
40. The arraignment is the defendant's first official court appearance. At this 
stage he is :normally informed of the pending charge and he enters a plea. 
41. 399 U.S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387, 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970). 
42. At the preliminary hearing the judge determines whether there is sufficient 
evidence against the accused to warrant a trial. The standard is normally probable 
cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime. 
560 PAUL MARCUS 
witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained 
counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has 
against his client and make possible the preparation of a 
proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, coun-
sel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in mak-
ing effective arguments for the accused on such matters as 
the necessity for an early psychiatric examinaiton or bail. 
The inability of the indigent accused on his own to real-
ize these advantages of a lawyer's assistance compels the 
conclusion that the Alabama preliminary hearing is a "criti-
cal stage" of the State's criminal process at which the ac-
cused is "as much entitled to such aid [of counsel) . . . as at 
the trial itself."43 
The Court also concluded that post-trial proceedings could ne-
cessitate the right to counsel. At sentencing hearings the defendant 
was entitled to the appointment of counsel, even in cases where 
counsel had already served at the guilt determination stage of the 
trial.44 Moreover, the defendant had an absolute right to counsel at 
his first appeal under the rationale set out in Douglas v. 
California .45 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty the Court had in resolving right 
to counsel claims arose in connection with pre-trial identification 
procedures. In United States v. Wade ,46 the question was whether 
"courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded 
from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses 
before trial at a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification 
purposes without notice to and in the absence of the accused's ap-
pointed counsel."47 The question was answered in the affirmative, 
based on the view that the pre-trial identification procedure was a 
"critical stage" under the Sixth Amendment. 
It is central to that principle that in addition to counsel's 
presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not 
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecu-
43. 399 U.S. at 9. 
44. In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336, 88 S. Ct. 254 (1967), the Court 
required counsel at the sentencing proceeding because the lawyer would insure that 
the judge relied on accurate information. The lawyer would also protect the defend-
ant's procedural rights with respect to matters such as the right to appeal, the right to 
withdraw his plea of guilty, and the jurisdiction of the court to impose sentence. It 
should be noted, however, that the Court was not willing to require counsel at proba-
tion and parole revocation hearings. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 
656, 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973), the Court distinguished the trial and sentencing cases by 
finding that the rights of the probationer or parolee were far more limited because 
that person had already been convicted of a crime at a previous time. 
45. 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963). But see, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 
U.S. 600, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974), where it was concluded that the right to 
counsel did not extend to discretionary appeals such as review before the state and 
United States Supreme Courts. 
46. 388 U.S. 218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967). 
47. 388 U.S. at 219-20. 
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tion, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's ab-
sence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. 
(T] he principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases 
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the 
accused to determine whether the presence of his consel is 
necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair 
trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine 
the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of 
counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze 
whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's 
rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability 
of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.48 
561 
While the Court has limited this right to counsel to post-judicial 
adversary proceedings49 in which the accused is personally con-
fronted,50 it is readily apparent that the Justices have been quite 
willing to extend the right to counsel well beyond the criminal trial 
itself. 
THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION: F ARETTA v. CALIFORNIA 5l 
The question in Faretta was "whether a defendant in a state 
criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel 
when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Stated another 
way, the question is whether a State may constitutionally hale a 
person into its criminal courts and there force a lawyer upon him, 
even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense."52 
The Court concluded that the state could not constitutionally do so. 
Faretta was charged with grand theft. The public defender was 
appointed to represent him at the arraignment. Faretta, however, 
specifically requested that he be permitted to represent himself. He 
had once represented himself in a criminal prosecution, he had a 
high school education, and he did not want to be represented by the 
public defender because he thought the office was "very loaded 
down with ... a heavy case load." The judge advised Faretta that 
he was making a mistake and told Faretta that he would receive no 
special favors from the court.53 
48. /d. at 226-27. 
49. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972). 
50. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L. Ed. 2d 619, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973). 
51. 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). 
52. 422 U.S. at 806. 
53. You are going to follow the procedure. You are going to have to ask the 
questions right. If there is an objection to the form of the question and it is 
properly taken, it is going to be sustained. We are going to respect you. We 
are going to give you every chance, but you are going to play with the same 
ground rules that anybody plays. And you don't know those ground rules. 
You wouldn't know those ground rules any more than any other lawyer will 
know those ground rules until he gets out and tries a lot of cases. And you 
haven't done it. 
/d. at 808 n. 2. 
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The judge, before making a final decision, held a hearing and in-
quired with some specificity into the defendant's ability to conduct 
his own defense.54 At this hearing the judge ruled that the defend-
ant had not made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to 
54. THE COURT: In the Faretta matter, I brought you back down here to do 
some reconsideration as to whether or not you should continue to represent 
yourself. 
How have you been getting along on your research? 
THE DEFENDANT: Not bad, your Honor. 
Last night I put in the mail a 995 motion and it should be with the Clerk 
within the next day or two. 
THE COURT: Have you been preparing yourself for the intricacies of the 
trial of the matter? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, your Honor, I was hoping that the case could 
possibly be disposed of on the 995. 
Mrs. Ayers informed me yesterday that it was the Court's policy to hear 
the pretrial motions at the time of trial. If possible, your Honor, I would like 
a date set as soon as the Court deems adequate after they receive the mo-
tion, sometime before trial. 
THE COURT: Let's see how you have been doing on your research. 
How many exceptions are there to the hearsay rule? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, the hearsay rule would, I guess, be called the 
best evidence rule, your Honor. And there are several exceptions in case law, 
but in actual statutory law, I don't feel there is none. 
THE COURT: What are the challenges to the jury for cause? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, there is twelve peremptory challenges. 
THE COURT: And how many for cause? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, as many as the Court deems valid. 
THE COURT: And what are they? What are the grounds for challenging 
a juror for cause? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, numerous grounds to challenge a witness-! 
mean, a juror, your Honor, one being the juror is perhaps suffered, was a vic-
tim of the same type of offense, might be prejudice toward the defendant. 
Any substantial ground that might make the juror prejudice toward the 
defendant. 
is? 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, a relative perhaps of the victim. 
THE COURT: Have you taken a look at that code section to see what it 
THE DEFENDANT: Challenge a juror? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. I have done-
THE COURT: What is the code section? 
THE DEFENDANT: On voir diring a jury, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: I am not aware of the section right offhand. 
THE COURT: What code is it in? 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, the research I have done on challenging would 
be in Witkins Jurisprudence. 
THE COURT: Have you looked at any of the codes to see where these 
various things are taken up? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor, I haven't. 
THE COURT: Have you looked in any of the California Codes with refer-
ence to trial procedure? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: What codes? 
THE DEFENDANT: I have done extensive research in the Penal Code, 
your Honor, and the Civil Code. 
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the assistance of counsel and further ruled that he had no constitu-
tional right to conduct his own defense. Thereafter the public de-
fendant represented Faretta at his trial. The jury found Faretta 
guilty and the judge sentenced him to prison. 
In the federal setting, the right of self-representation had been 
well established. 55 Moreover, the constitutions of many states ex-
plicitly confer that right. In some states, such as California, how-
ever, the right to represent oneself is not so conferred, thus raising 
the constitutional issue. 
In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court held that 
the defendant had a constitutionally protected right to represent 
himself, a right which was not "inferior to the right of assistance of 
counsel."-i6 The early constitutional history, according to the Court, 
showed that there was no evidence that the colonists and the fram-
ers ever doubted the right of self-representation, or imagined that 
this right might not be considered equal in stature to the right to 
counsel.57 Moreover, because the "defendant, and not his lawyer or 
the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction"58 he 
must be able to choose whether to represent himself or whether he 
should be represented by counsel. "[A]lthough he may conduct his 
own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be 
honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood 
of the law.' "59 
Of course, in order to exercise his right of self-representation, 
the defendant must first knowingly and intelligently waive the right 
/d. 
THE COURT: If you have done extensive research into it, then tell me 
about it. 
THE DEFENDANT: On empaneling a jury, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, the District Attorney and the defendant, de-
fense counsel, has both the right to 12 peremptory challenges of a jury. 
These 12 challenges are undisputable. Any reason that the defense or prose-
cution ~:hould feel that a juror would be inadequate to try the case or to rule 
on a ca:;e, they may then discharge that juror. 
But if there is a valid challenge due to grounds of prejudice or some 
other grounds, that these aren't considered in the 12 peremptory challenges. 
There are numerous and the defendant, the defense and the prosecution both 
have the right to make any inquiry to the jury as to their feelings toward the 
case. 
55. In the federal courts, the right of self-representation has been protected 
by statute since the beginnings of our Nation. Section 35 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President 
Washington one day before the Sixth Amendment was proposed, provided 
that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage 
their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel ... " The 
right is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654. 
/d. at 812-13. 
56. ld. at 832. 
57. /d. at 826-32. 
58. /d. at 834. 
59. /d. 
564 PAUL MARCUS 
to counsel. Thus, he would have to be "made aware of the dangers 
and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will es-
tablish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open.' "60 Because Faretta, under the circumstances in the 
case, had clearly expressed his desire to represent himself, and had 
knowingly and intelligently decided to relinquish the benefits of 
counsel, the California courts deprived him of his constitutional 
right to conduct his own defense. 
The Chief Justice61 dissented. He could find no constitutional 
basis for the majority's holding; he stressed that such a holding 
would "only add to the problems of an already malfunctioning crimi-
nal justice system."62 For him, the determinative factor was that to 
do justice, in most cases, counsel would be required. 
In short, both the "spirit and the logic" of the Sixth 
Amendment are that every person accused of crime shall re-
ceive the fullest possible defense; in the vast majority of 
cases this command can be honored only means of the ex-
pressly-guaranteed right to counsel, and the trial judge is in 
the best position to determine whether the accused is capa-
ble of conducting his defense. True freedom of choice and 
society's interest in seeing that justice is achieved can be 
vindicated only if the trial court retains discretion to reject 
any attempted waiver of counsel and insist that the accused 
be tried according to the Constitution. This discretion is as 
critical an element of basic fairness as a trial judge's discre-
tion to decline to accept a plea of guilty.63 
As Justice Blackmun64 put it: 
If there is any truth to the old proverb that "one who is 
his own lawyer has a fool for a client," the Court by its opin-
ion today now bestows a constitutional right on one to make 
a fool of himself. 65 
BEYOND FARETI'A 
The Court in Faretta thus established that a right of self-repre-
sentation had been established along with the right to counsel. It 
recognized that this coexistence was an uneasy one in light of the 
heavy emphasis which the Court had previously placed on the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel: 
There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an ac-
cused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the 
grain of this Court's decisions holding that the Constitution 
requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned 
60. Id. at 835. 
61. Joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. 
62. 422 U.S. at 837. 
63. Id. at 840. 
64. Joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. 
65. 422 U.S. at 853. 
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unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of 
counsel. For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those 
decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure 
the defendant a fair trial,66 
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Nonetheless, the right was formally affirmed by the Supreme Court 
and it was left to the lower courts to deal with the manifestation of 
this right. 
1. Waiver 
Because the self-representation right is an important one under 
the Constitution, the waiver of it comes within the confines of the 
rule set out almost a half century ago. 
It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reason-
able presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitu-
tional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in 
the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege. The determination of whether there has 
been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, 
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experi-
ence, and conduct of the accused.67 
As this ruling indicates, the waiver68 determination depends upon 
the particular facts in the case, focusing especially on the individual 
defendant making the decision. Few cases will be as easy as 
Faretta itself in terms of dealing with an intelligent defendant who 
understood his rights; still, a relatively low threshhold of ability is 
all that is required. For instance, the Faretta Court itself held that a 
lack of legal knowledge was not determinative as to whether the de-
fendant had knowingly waived his right to counsel and chosen to 
represent himself. 
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and 
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelli-. 
gently to choose self-representation, he should be made 
aware of the dangers and advantages of self-representation, 
so that the record will establish that he "knows what he is 
doing and his choice is made with eyes open."69 
The importance of determining that the defendant had sufficient 
intelligence to understand the dangers and disadvantages of waiving 
counsel and representing himself has often been emphasized. In 
one recent case, the defendant's conviction was reversed where the 
trial record did not affirmatively show that the defendant was com-
petent to knowingly waive his right to counsel. The court held that 
66. !d. at 832-33. 
67. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). 
68. Of course, the defendant is not simply waiving a single right; rather he is 
electing between two rights: representing himself and being represented by counsel. 
69. 422 U.S. at 835. 
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in order to establish that the waiver was intelligent and voluntary, 
the record must reflect that the trial judge inquired into the defend-
ant's background, age, education, and experience. Moreover, the 
trial judge must inform the defendant of the inherent dangers in-
volved in self-representation, including, among other things: the 
general nature. of the offense and possible penalties that may be im-
posed; the lack of the defendant's knowledge of technical rules of 
evidence and procedure in criminal law; the inability of the trial 
judge to give the defendant any special treatment when he is repre-
senting himself.70 
In addition to the basic question of waiver is the question of 
whether the trial court has an obligation to give notice to the de-
fendant of his right of self-representation. While the Faretta court 
talked in terms of this right being of great importance, most courts 
have refused to require the giving of such notice. As stated by the 
Washington supreme court: 
In the vast majority of cases it is contrary to the best inter-
ests of a defendant to proceed pro se. Routinely informing 
all defendants of that "right" of inquiry whether they wish 
to exercise it would encourage many to waive the valuable 
right to be represented by competent counsel. Further, a 
defendant cannot claim that by having counsel-because he 
was not informed of his self-representation right or asked if 
he wished to waive it-he has been denied a fair trial or due 
process .... We hold there is no duty for the trial court to 
inform the defendant of or ask if he wishes to exercise his 
right to proceed pro se. 71 
2. The Incompetent Defendant 
Related to the question of waiver is the question of the compe-
tency of the defendant both to make the initial decision of self-rep-
resentation and, ultimately, to represent himself at trial. Of course, 
if the defendant is deemed not to be competent to stand trial, either 
at the outset of the trial or during the trial, the issue evaporates. No 
trial can constitutionally be held. The more difficult question is 
whether a defendant can be competent for some purposes, but not 
for others. In People v. Miller72 the defendant was found to be le-
gally insane at her probation hearing. The appellate court neverthe-
less upheld her conviction finding that she had competently waived 
her right to counsel before trial. The court relied upon the fact that 
the trial judge found that she had understood the warnings given 
and that she had forcefully requested the right to proceed on her 
own. The defendant contended that a document she had filed dur-
ing the proceedings along with other evidence should have caused 
70. Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 313-14 (Texas 1980). 
71. State v. Garcia, 600 P.2d 1014, 1015 (Wash. 1979). See also, People v. Slaughter, 
39 Ill. Dec. 467, 84 Ill. App.3d 88, 404 N.E.2d 1058 (1980). 
72. 110 Cal. App.3d 327, 167 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1980). 
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the trial court to doubt her competence; the appellate court rejected 
this view. 
While bizarre actions and statements are to be noted, they 
do not establish incompetency warranting deprivation of the 
right to represent oneself . . . . 73 
With regard to the question of whether a defendant who is 
found to be competent to stand trial can still be found incompetent 
to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and thus 
represent himself, the courts are in conflict. Some courts take the 
position that if a defendant is competent to stand trial, he is also 
competent to intelligently waive his right to counsel and to repre-
sent himself. "[F]rom a practical viewpoint it should be even more 
difficult to formulate a workable, and presumably higher, standard 
of competency which would not infringe on the defendant's constitu-
tional right 'to appear and defend in person.' "74 Many courts, how-
ever, disagree with this conclusion. In People v. Salas,75 the cowi 
on appeal held that the trial judge should, when necessary, provide 
a psychiatric examination to determine whether the defendant has 
the capacity to knowingly waive representation by counsel. In 
Salas, psychiatric examination showed that the defendant had 
(1) low intelligence, (2) impaired capacity for thought, 
(3) lack of insight into his own psychological and intellec-
tual limitations, ( 4) lack of comprehension of what compe-
tent counsel can and cannot do for him, and (5) significant 
language impairment.76 
Upon review of this examination it was found that the defendant 
was competent to stand trial, but incompetent to knowingly waive 
his right to counsel and proceed to represent himself.77 
Perhaps the most forceful argument on this point was made in a 
recent Wisconsin case. The court there expressly held that "compe-
tency to stand trial is not the same as competency to proceed pro se 
and that, even though he has knowingly waived counsel, and elected 
to do so, a defendant may be prevented from representing him-
self."78 In rejecting the view that a defendant competent to stand 
trial would necessarily be competent to waive his right to counsel 
73. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 818. 
74. People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351, 354, 334 N.E.2d 572, 574, 372 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 
(1975). 
75. 77 Cal.App.3d 600, 143 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1978). 
76. 143 Cal. Rptr. at 757. 
77. See also, Commonwealth v. Glover, 247 Pa. Sup. Ct. 465, 467, 372 A.2d 919, 920 
(1977) [The court held that the defendant who only had a ninth grade education and 
could not understand the elements of the charges against him with the possible pen-
alties was not capable of making an intelligent waiver, although defendant was com-
petent to stand trial]; State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 160, 568 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1977) (There 
was evidence that the defendant was physically incapable of presenting a defense be-
cause stress affected his speech and made him susceptible to seizures and that he 
was too emotionally disturbed to make an intelligent waiver, the trial court was war-
ranted in rescinding permission to proceed to represent himself]. 
78. Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Wis. 1980). 
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and represent himself, the court found that competency to stand 
trial indicates merely an ability to cooperate with defense counsel. 
Competency to affirmatively formulate a coherent defense, on the 
other hand, demands much more of the defendant. The court re-
jected the test that a knowing and intelligent waiver is all that is re-
quired in order for a defendant to claim a constitutional right to 
defend himself. 
When a defendant expresses a desire to proceed pro se, the 
trial court should examine him on the record to determine 
not only whether his waiver of counsel is knowing and vol-
untary, but also to determine whether he possesses the 
minimal competence necessary to conduct his own defense. 
Factors to consider in making this second determination in-
clude the defendant's education, literacy, fluency in English, 
and any physical or psychological disability which may sig-
nificantly affect his ability to communicate a possible de-
fense to the jury.79 
If the defendant is found competent to represent himself, the 
judge had a continuing responsibility during the trial to supervise 
the defendant so as to insure that the defendant continues to be 
competent to present his case. 
/d. 
If, during the course of the trial, it becomes apparent that 
the defendant is simply incapable, because of an inability to 
communicate or because of a complete lack of understand-
ing, to present a defense that is at least prima facie valid, 
the trial court should step in and assign counsel. But be-
cause the defendant is not to be granted a second chance 
simply because the first is going badly, counsel should be 
79. /d. at 611. The court went on to explain its ruling: 
The standard for determining competency to stand trial is whether one is 
able to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own de-
fense. This test assumes the defendant will have representation and that he 
will be required only to assist in his defense. Certainly more is required 
where the defendant is to actually conduct his own defense and not merely 
assist in it. "One might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of 
standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of 
counsel." 
Other disabilities, besides mental diseases and defects of the type that 
render one incompetent to stand trial, may likewise make meaningful self-
representatiton impossible. Faretta itself indicates that although technical 
legal knowledge is not relevant, literacy and a basic understanding over and 
above the competence to stand trial may be required. Surely a defendant 
who, while mentally competent to be tried, is simply incapable of effective 
communication or, because of less than average intellectual powers, is unable 
to attain the minimal understanding necessary to present a defense, is not to 
be allowed "to go to jail under his own banner." Neither the state, nor the 
defendant, is in any sense served when a wrongful conviction is easily ob-
tained as a result of an incompetent defendant's attempt to defend himself. 
Thus, despite the fact that a defendant has been found competent to stand 
trial, it may nevertheless be determined that he lacks the capacity to repre-
sent himself. 
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appointed after trial has begun, or a mistrial ordered, only 
where it appears the defendant should not have been al-
lowed to proceed pro se in the first place. so 
3. Compliance with Court Rules 
569 
The Supreme Court in Faretta stated very clearly that the right 
of self-representation will not alter the rules of procedure in trials. 
The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the 
dign:ity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to corn-
ply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.81 
Of course, granting lay persons the right to represent themselves 
opens the door to wholesale procedural and evidentiary errors at 
trial. Following Faretta, courts have refused to allow such errors to 
be grounds for reversal. In recent cases, defendants have lost even 
though they: failed to object to the introduction of inadmissible evi-
dence,82 failed to object to misstatements made in closing argu-
ments,sa called adverse parties as their own witnesses.84 
Despite the fact that the defendant representing himself will 
have no legal expertise, the courts consistently state that such per- · 
sons "should receive no greater rights or privileges than counsel 
would have representing him."85 The trial judge is to operate as an 
impartial force in the proceeding and cannot "assist" the defendant 
who is representing himself. As stated in United States v. Pinkey:86 
"[T]he trial court is under no obligation to become 'advocate' for or 
to assist and guide the prose layman through the trial thicket." To 
be sure, when the trial judge does go beyond his role as impartial 
arbiter, constitutional errors can arise. See, for instance, People v. 
Nelson,87 where the trial court, frustrated with the prose defendant 
who was unable effectively to examine witnesses, appointed counsel 
for the defendant. The defendant's conviction was reversed on 
appeal. 
That the defendant lacked the technical legal knowledge for 
effeetive examination of witnesses was not a basis for termi-
nating his pro se defense. Although it may have contributed 
to the Court's impatience and led it to conclude that the in-
terest of justice required that defendant's pro se right to de-
fend be terminated, we find nothing in this record justifying 
such conclusion in light of defendant's constitutional right. 
If the defendant does not comply with the procedural or evidentiary 
80. /d. 
81. 422 U.S. at 834-35, n. 46. 
82. United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635, 637 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
83. State v. Cunningham, 222 Kan. 704, 707, 567 P.2d 879, 882 (1977). 
84. People v. Owens, 66 Cal.App.3d 720, 722, 136 Cal. Rptr. 215, 216 (1977). 
85. State v. Brincefield, 43 N.C.App. 49, 52, 258 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1979). 
86. 548 F.2d 305, 311 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
87. 72 A.D.2d 64, 67-68, 424 N.Y.S.2d 543, 546 (1980). 
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rules of the court, and indeed renders the trial a mockery, he is pro-
hibited from raising that issue on appeal. 
Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on ap-
peal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot 
thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense 
amo.unted to a denial of "effective assistance of counsel."88 
As explained by the Second Circuit in United States v. Denno :89 
(E]ven in cases where the accused is harming himself by 
insisting on conducting his own defense, respect for individ- · 
ual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under 
his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice 
"with eyes open." 
The rationale given for these holdings is that if the defendant will-
ingly takes on the responsibility of representing himself, he has no 
one to blame but himself if errors occur. And, this choice by the de-
fendant is of constitutional proportion. 
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contem-
plate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed 
by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant-
not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling 
defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To 
thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered 
wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a 
case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right 
. to make a defense is stripped of the personal character 
upon which the Amendment insists.9o 
4. The Disruptive Defendant 
In Faretta the State of California asserted that granting the 
right of self-representation created problems as to defendants who 
actively disrupted the proceedings of the trial court. The Supreme 
Court, however, was not persuaded by this contention. 
We are told that many criminal defendants representing 
themselves may use the courtroom for deliberate disruption 
of their trials. But the right of self-representation has been 
recognized from our beginnings by federal law and by most 
of the States, and no such result has thereby occurred. 
Moreover, the trial judge may terminate self-representation 
by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and ob-
structionist misconduct.91 
The leading Supreme Court decision discussing the disruptive 
defendant is Illinois v. Allen.92 
88. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-35, n. 46. 
89. 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 100. 
90. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820. 
91. ld. at 834-35, n. 46. 
92. 397 U.S. 337, 90S. Ct. 1057, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970). 
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Although mindful that courts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against the loss of constitutional rights, we explic-
itly hold today that a defendant can lose his right to be 
presEmt at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge 
that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive be-
havior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a 
manner so disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful of the 
court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the 
courtroom.93 
571 
In a number of recent cases the Allen principle has been applied to 
allow the trial judge to terminate the defendant's right to self-repre-
sentation when that defendant engages in disruptive ,trial tactics. 
The trial judge in Parker v. State 94 allowed the defendant to repre-
sent himself and the defendant refused to enter the courtroom and 
resisted all attempts by court officials to put him in the courtroom. 
The trial judge then placed the defendant in a nearby room where 
he could. hear the proceedings and the court continued the trial 
without his being present .. This judicial action was constitutionally 
proper. Under Allen, though, the disruptive activity must take place 
at trial and must be of a truly serious nature.95 As the federal court 
of appeals said in Dougherty v. United States:96 
(T) he unqualified right of self-representation rests on an 
implied assumption that the court will be able to achieve 
reasonable cooperation. The possibility that reasonable co-
operation may be withheld, and the right later waived, is no 
reason for denying the right of self-representation at the 
start. 
To avoid the problems of the wholly ineffective defendant who 
represents himself and disrupts the trial, many courts appoint attor-
neys either as "stand-by" counsel or as amicus curiae to aid the ac-
cused and be able to assume representation of the defendant should 
that necessity arise.97 
Because Faretta recognized that the right to counsel and the 
right of self-representation were separate and independent constitu-
tional rights98 most courts have taken the position that a criminal 
defendant cannot exercise both rights at the same time. 
93. 397 U.S. at 344. 
94. 556 P.2d 1298 (Okla. Crim. 1976). 
95. In Ferrel v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 888, 576 P.2d 93, 144 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1978) 
the state supreme court reversed the conviction of the defendant in a case in which 
the trial court had wrongfully denied pro se status to the jailed defendant on the ba-
sis of repeated violations of jail rules which constituted out of cart misconduct. The 
trial judge in Coleman v. State, 617 P.2d 243 (Okla. ·Crim. 1980) had denied the defend-
ant the right to proceed without counsel because the defendant had a prior jail es-
cape record. The appellate court held that concern for security and anticipation of 
possible future misconduct were not valid bases for denying a defendant his Faretta 
rights. 
96. 473 F.2d lll3, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
97. !d., Cano v. Municipality of Anchorage, 627 P.2d 660 (Alaska 1981). 
98. 422 U.S. at 819-20, n. 15. 
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The right to defend pro se and the right to defend with the 
assistance of counsel are but two faces of the same coin. 
The assertation of one right, of necessity, waives the other. 
These constitutional rights may not actively co-exist-they 
do not do cadence in tandem.99 
The rationale which underlies such statements is a fear of causing 
chaos in the orderly trial proceedings and disrupting the traditional 
role of the attorney.l00 Yet, it is not clear that the use of the defend-
ant in part of the trial (perhaps in arguments and in confronting a 
few witnesses) and the use of an attorney in the same trial (perhaps 
in making motions and examining other witnesses and making ob-
jections) would necessarily be disruptive. Moreover, considering 
the important nature of the right of self-representation, one may 
properly ask whether courts should routinely deny the request for 
this hybrid form of representation. The following statement by An-
gela Davis makes the point quite well: 
I consider my own participation decisive for my defense. 
One might argue that since I am determined to play an ac~ 
tive role in the trial, I should fire my lawyers and assume 
the entire burden of the defense. This is to say, if I wish to 
exercise my constitutional right to defend myself, I must re-
linquish the right to counsel. This either/or situation flies 
blatantly in the face of justice. Rigorously speaking, neither 
is a right, if one must be renounced in order to exercise the 
other. Should I be penalized because I do not possess the 
legal knowledge, experience or expertise necessary to pro-
ceed entirely pro se ?101 
CONCLUSION 
Gideon v. Wainwright and later cases such as Argersinger, 
Wade, and Scott established the important right to counsel for indi-
gent criminal defendants in both federal and state courts. The 
Supreme Court in Faretta v. California found a constitutional right 
of the criminal defendant to reject the assistance of counsel and to 
represent himself. As pointed out by the majority in Faretta there 
are important historical and policy reasons for these independent 
rights. Nevertheless, the establishment of such independent rights 
99. People v. Woodruff, 40 Ill. Dec. 788, 85 Ill.App.3d 654, 659, 406 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 
(1980). See also, United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Sacco, 571 F.2d 791, 793 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 435 U.S. 999; Wheby v. 
Warden, 95 Nev. 567, 598 P.2d 1152 (1979). 
100. Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. Crim. 1977). For a good discussion 
of this area, see, DeFoor & Mitchell, Hybrid Representation: An Analysis of a Crimi-
nal Defendant's Right to Participate as Co-Counsel at Trial, 10 STETSON L. REV. 191 
(1981). 
101. A. Davis, IF THEY CoME IN THE MoRNING, 253 (1971) quoted and discussed in 
Note, THE RIGHT TO DEFEND PROSE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS-FARETTA V. CALIFOR-
NIA, 37 OHIO STATE L.J. 220, 237-39 (1976). 
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has created difficulties for lawyers and judges today. 102 
Still, many of these problems may be more apparent than real. 
Most defendants do not elect to represent themselves. Moreover, 
even in those cases where self-representation is the rule, truly seri-
ous problems do not generally appear. Even when they do appear, 
it may be that they are but a small price to pay to insure that the 
defendant who so desires, can exercise his right of self-representa-
tion, a right which is "independently found in the structure and his-
tory of the constitutional text."103 
102. Some of these questions were tracked very well by Justice Blackmun in his 
dissent in Paretta: 
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when 
must that notice be given? Since the right to assistance of counsel and the 
right to self-representation are mutually exclusive, how is the waiver of each 
right to be measured? If a defendant has elected to exercise his right to 
proceed pro se, does he still have a constitutional right to assistance of 
standby counsel? How soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant de-
cide between proceeding by counsel or prose? Must he be allowed to switch 
in mid·trial? May a violation of the right to self-representation ever be harm-
less error? Must the trial court treat the pro se defendant differently than it 
would professional counsel? 
422 U.S. at 852. 
103. ld. at 819-20, n. 15. 
